Beyond the Philosopher's Fear (Intersections: Continental by Ludger H. Viefhues-Bailey

By Ludger H. Viefhues-Bailey

In line with a close research of gender in Stanley Cavell's remedy of the skeptical challenge, this e-book addresses the connection among gender and faith in sleek skepticism. conducting discussion with Julia Kristeva's philosophy, Viefhues claims non secular challenge underlies Cavell's figuring out of the female. the female which the skeptic fears is construed as a placeholder for the past, marking the transcendence of our origins that are elusive but while a part of ourselves. it truly is argued spiritual query of origins hence lies on the center of the fashionable skeptical challenge.

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Beyond the Philosopher’s Fear 30 Going on, and initiation This openness and flexibility of our language use is central to Cavell’s Wittgensteinian vision of language. Cavell writes: If what can be said in a language is not everywhere determined by rules, nor its understanding anywhere secured through universals, and if there are always new contexts to be met, new needs, new relationships, new objects, new perceptions to be recorded and shared, then perhaps it is as true of a master of a language as of his apprentice that though ‘in a sense’ we learn the meaning of words and what objects are, the learning is never over, and we keep finding new potencies in words and new ways in which objects are disclosed.

Wittgenstein’s criteria point us to these facts and to the fact that besides our concurrence in judgment, our mutual attunement in not failing to know them, we have nothing to go on. The skeptic’s worries disclose this feature of our claims to knowledge. They reveal an uneasiness with the fact that what counts as being the case or what is the case, is fundamentally deeply dependent on our mutual agreements. From Criteria to Projection Affeldt, Mulhall, Putnam and Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein’s criteria Systematicity of language and a system in language A recent discussion between Steven Affeldt, Hilary Putnam, and Stephen Mulhall can shed light on why it is so problematic for many philosophers to accept the fact that what counts as, or what is the case, is so deeply dependent on our mutual agreements.

40 Putnam, ‘Skepticism, Stroud and the Contextuality of Knowledge,’ p. 2. 34 Beyond the Philosopher’s Fear A statement like ‘I am working on the computer’ (or ‘I have five fingers’) can only be considered a claim if we can conceive of a way in which Putnam might not have known that he is working on the computer (or why I should not know that I have five fingers) (cf. CR, p. 210). The point of claiming or asserting these things has to be made clear. It is part of the grammar of ‘knowing x’ that we can imagine what it would be not to know x.

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